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THEORIZING BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS:
A DEFENSE OF EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS AND THE LAW
Neel P. Parekh*
Behavioral law and economics (BLE) provides a steady stream of empirical evi-
dence that counters the predictions of law and economics. Despite this research
and data, however, many theorists argue that BLE ultimately fails because it pos-
its no underlying theory. This Note argues that perspectives from evolutionary
biology, evolutionary psychology, and the brain sciences can provide the missing
motivational theory for BLE's empirical findings. The Note also examines the
implications a more consistent and reasoned consideration of evolutionary analy-
sis and the law (EA) has for our legal regime. In theorizing BLE and defending
EA, this Note aims to show how evolutionary analysis can supplant law and
economics in those instances where the latter's predictions prove false and its in-
centive structure fails to motivate behavior
INTRODUCTION
Law and economics rested in a fairly comfortable place from the
1970s to the mid-1990s. Those challengers who attempted to chip
away at its main tenets, primarily the rational actor model and ex-
pected utility theory, largely failed. Eventually, in a Kuhnian sense,
law and economics became the new analytical paradigm in legal
studies. As a result, law schools hired more economists, law stu-
dents struggled with Coase, and Posner found his way to the
Seventh Circuit.
Although the counterarguments fell short, it is clear that ex-
planatory gaps riddle economic theory. After all, if economics
predicted all behavior, other social sciences would likely be laid to
rest. And if law and economics' forecasts were absolute, our legal
rules and decisions would be exact and organize society into clear
arrangements of entitlements and duties. Judges would draft per-
fect opinions, legislators would rarely repeal laws, and people, in a
state of Coaseian bliss, would negotiate the night away.
Unfortunately the picture of law and economics is not so rosy.
Simply stated, people do not act as rational choice forecasts.
Behavioral law and economics ("BLE"), one of the newest camps
in legal studies, makes this particularly salient through empirical
* J.D. Candidate, Michigan 2003; A.B., Brown 2000. Thanks to James Krier, Ronen
Avraham and Owen Jones for comments and criticism.
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observation.1 BLE, for example, whittles away at expected utility
theory. This central tenet of economics holds, "[F]or each
available option, the expected payoff that would be obtained if the
alternative is chosen is calculated .... [T]he expected payoff of
one option [is determined] by summing the products of the
probabilities and the values of outcomes contingent on
probabilities., 3 Based on this calculus, a rational actor will choose
the option with the highest expected payoff by balancing
preferences and evaluating risk.
BLE's empirical data show that in fact people often do not
choose the path to the highest expected payoff.4 BLE categorized
these departures from rational action and labeled them a function
of cognitive biases, heuristics, and bounded rationality, willpower,
and self-interest.5 An example of these defects in the rational actor
model comes from BLE's discussion of expected utility theory. One
explanation for our inability to act economically stresses that
bounded rationality6 limits the brain's ability to capture complex
statistical principles.7 Consequently, individuals cannot perform
the probabilistic calculation that expected utility demands.
BLE points out the limits of neo-classical economics with tangi-
ble empirical data." In doing so, it shows that legal policies
predicated on the assumption that people act economically
should, in some situations, be altered in order to best direct behav-
ior. In this sense, BLE should be viewed as a path "to new and
1. Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 282-83
(2001) (book review) ("The contribution of the behavioralists is to bring to bear an increas-
ingly large and persuasive body of experimental evidence ... that rational choice theory
can be a poor predictor of human behavior."). For an introduction to behavioral law and
economics, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
2. Expected utility theory was first formulated by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1947).
3. Catrin Rode & X.T. Wang, Risk-Sensitive Decision Making Examined Within an Evolu-
tionary Framework, 43 Am. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 926, 927 (2000). While Rode & Wang do not fall
into the BLE camp, their work discusses behavioral economics.
4. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 13, 50.
5. Id. at 50. In coming to this explanation, BLE drew from prior works in psychology
including Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982) and Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955).
6. For a detailed discussion of bounded rationality see infra Part II.
7. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 928; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at
7-11.
8. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1.
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improved understandings of the real-world effects of law, and ulti-
mately to better uses of law as an instrument of social ordering."9
Despite BLE's powerful observations, law and economics criti-
cized the movement and skeptically scrutinized its findings.
Richard Posner, while lauding the intellectual value of BLE,' ° ar-
gued that what little BLE gains through observation it loses in
parsimony. He noted that "in theory-making, descriptive accuracy
is purchased at a price, the price being loss of predictive power.
The rational-choice economist asks what 'rational man' would do
in a given situation, and usually the answer is pretty clear.... But it
is profoundly unclear what 'behavioral man' would do in any given
situation.""
Posner more centrally propounded that BLE fails as a scientific
endeavor because it lacks a theory. He posited that:
[BLE] is undertheorized because of its residual, and in con-
sequence purely empirical character. Behavioral economics is
defined by its subject rather than by its method and its subject
is merely the set of phenomena that rational-choice models
(or at least the simplest of them) do not explain. It would not
be surprising if many of these phenomena turned out to be
unrelated to each other, just as the set of things that are not
edible by man include stones, toadstools, thunderclaps, and
the Pythagorean theorem. Describing, specifying, and classify-
ing the empirical failures of a theory is a valid and important
scholarly activity. But it is not an alternative theory."
Posner held that because BLE is devoid of theory, it is unfalsifiable
and accordingly, under the rubrics of science, useless.
3
Posner is right; behavioral law and economics is
undertheorized. This, however, does not obviate BLE's findings
because a theory may very well come ex post. In fact, a theory that
comes after observation may be sounder than others because it
avoids the explanatory equivalent of Heisenberg's Uncertainty
Principle.' 4 While searching for information consistent with a
9. Id. at 10.
10. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1551, 1551 (1998) ("I don't doubt that there is something to behavioral economics,
and that law can benefit from its insights.").
11. Id. at 1559.
12. Id. at 1559-60.
13. Id. at 1560-61.
14. For more on Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle see WERNER HEISENBERG, THE
PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (1930).
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theory, researchers often skew the data they obtain. The aims of
the theoretical project distort the true nature of empirical
evidence and the interpretation of information. Having a theory ex
post might avoid the biases of a theoretical program while
concurrently counteringJudge Posner.
Where might a theory for behavioral law and economics come
from? Following his critique of BLE, Posner hinted that evolution-
ary biology can provide valuable explanatory power. 5 Other
theorists have since argued the same. 16 In doing so, they stress that
"the potential of studying decision making from an evolutionary
perspective is that it can provide functional explanations as well as
process models of psychological phenomenon." 7 This Note
agrees-evolutionary analysis offers a theoretical basis for BLE.
Evolutionary sciences-primarily perspectives from biology and
psychology-argue that at least some of the irrationality BLE ob-
serves is a product of natural selection.'8 The human brain, the
situs of behavior and a creation of natural selection, was formed to
deal with the complex decision tasks recurrent in hominid evolu-
tion.' 9 Accordingly, the brain may never have developed the
computational capacity for economic rational choice because our
ancestors did not face the kinds of decisions economics demands
of us today. As the biologist Steven Pinker notes, "Natural selection
... did not shape us to earn good grades in science class or to pub-
lish in refereed journals. It shaped us to master the local
environment, and that led to discrepancies between how we natu-
rally think and what is demanded in the academy."2 0 Similarly,
• 21
natural selection did not shape us to be economic beings.
Evolution then proposes a theory that attempts to predict hu-
man behavior, particularly in the areas where economics has failed,
by explaining the origins and capacity of human cognition. BLE's
studies provide the support for evolution's forecasts. Together they
present a new paradigm, evolutionary analysis and the law ("EA"),
15. Posner, supra note 10, at 1561.
16. See, e.g., Owen D.Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behav-
ioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter Jones,
Time]. While Time specifically addresses biology as a tool for explaining behavioral law and
economics, ProfessorJones' other articles provide additional insight into the fusion of biol-
ogy, evolution, and the law. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 283 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavior]. For a more de-
tailed list of works pertaining to biology, evolution, and the law seeJones, Timeat 1143 n.7.
17. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 928; see alsoJones, Time, supra note 16, at 1142-45.
18. Seegenerally STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997).
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id. at 302.
21. "Economic" is used in the modem sense-negotiating preferences and calculating
risks in order to produce the most efficient outcome.
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which predicts and explains human irrationality through the com-
bination of a motivational theory (evolution) and an empirical
study (BLE). The hope is that this new paradigm will, at the very
least, bolster rational choice theory.
This Note summarizes and defends evolutionary analysis and the
law and suggests that it be used to supplement law and economics.
Part I discusses the value of developing a theory to explain BLE's
findings. Part II describes evolution's relevance to cognitive short-
comings, provides examples of evolutionary explanations theorists
have generated to understand irrational behavior, notes some cri-
tiques of EA, and, last, attempts to refute them. Part III discusses
the tangible impact that EA can have on the law by providing a
better understanding of human behavior.22
PART I. WHY Do WE NEED A THEORY?
Before discussing EA in depth, one might question why we need
a theory for BLE. If the field produces valid empirical data,
shouldn't that be enough? Why should we, like Posner, demand
that BLE be theorized? In response, this Note posits that theories
are necessary for at least three reasons: (1) theories highlight
causes, (2) theories beget theories, and (3) theories facilitate re-
ductionism.
One example of the first justification, theories highlight causes,
comes from medicine. Adult males are highly susceptible to
prostate tumors.23 Scientists and physicians now know that high
levels of prostate specific antigen (PSA) indicate that "something"
is wrong with the prostate.24 That something may be cancer or it
may be any number of conditions. PSA screening does not identify
25the source of the problem, it just demonstrates that one exists.
22. This analysis is done through the lens of science. Note that some of the texts ref-
erenced are what many consider "popular" science works. One might consider this reliance
a flaw. Referencing these materials, however, permits those unfamiliar with science to un-
derstand EA. Accessibility is the touchstone.
23. STANLEY ROBBINS ET AL., PATHOLOGICAL BASIS OF DISEASE, POCKET COMPANION
408 (5th ed. Pocket Companion 1995); Ray M. Merrill & Mark K_ Morris, Prevalence-Corrected
Prostate Cancer Incidence Rates and Trends, 155 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 148, 148 (2002).
24. Howard I. Scher, Hyperplastic and Malignant Diseases of the Prostrate, HARRISON'S
ONLINE *1, *3 at www.harrisononline.com (last modified Aug. 14, 2002).
25. Barnett S. Kramer et al., Prostate Cancer Screening: What We Know and What We Need
to Know, 119(9) ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 914, 915 (1993) ("The PSA assay is not specific for
prostate cancer. Serum levels can be increased with benign disease and are often normal
with malignant disease.").
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Accordingly, a man with high levels of PSA would not benefit from
the test unless the results could be explained. Without a theory as
to what causes the reading, physicians have a vague and unhelpful
understanding of a patient's ailment. Absent a causal explanation
(established here by a biopsy), a doctor could treat a patient for all
those conditions that raise PSA levels or make random guesses as
to the origin and treat the guesses. This is inefficient and, in the
case of medicine, may be just as deadly as failing to treat at all. In
contrast, when we have a theory about what causes the readings,
we can effectively respond to a condition.
Gravity provides another example.26 Mariners knew for years
prior to Newton's theory of gravity that tides varied relative to the
position of the moon. They never knew why, but they readily ob-
served that tides changed. These sailors could have logged tides
during various lunar conditions and hoped this running tab would
help them predict tides in the future. It is questionable whether or
not doing so would have yielded results. What is certain is that
when Newton attached a theory to these and other phenomena,
we understood why tides changed and could precisely forecast
them. By positing a theory, Newton enabled us to master gravity
and deal with its challenges rather than just assemble results and
hope they lead to something.27
26. This example is from WESLEY C. SALMON, CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION 129
(1998).
27. See, e.g., BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: STRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS,
AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY 57 (1999). Despite Newton's elucidation of
gravity, even he was unable to fully explain its cause. As physicist and string-theorist Brian
Greene notes:
"[Newton] gave the world an 'owner's manual' for gravity which delineated how to
'use' it-instructions that physicists, astronomers, and engineers have exploited suc-
cessfully to plot the course of rockets to the moon ... to predict solar and lunar
eclipses; to predict the motion of comets, and so on. But he left the inner workings
... a complete mystery."
Id.
Einstein filled in the Newtonian gaps with his general theory of relativity. Nonetheless,
Newton's attempts at explaining the phenomenon of gravity permitted science to take a
step up on the ladder of theoretical accuracy and sophistication. See id. at 56-62.
Richard Morris adds to the discussion of the value of efforts to explain. He writes, "If sci-
entists did nothing but conduct experiments, our insights into the workings of nature could
never have advanced beyond those of the medieval alchemists. It would be impossible to
gain an understanding of the nature of the universe . ... " RICHARD MORRIS, DISMANTLING
THE UNIVERSE 182 (1983). At heart, we want theories because they provide explanations
and explanations provide "knowledge of mechanisms of production and propagation of struc-
ture in the world.... [t]hat goes some distance beyond mere recognition of regularities
.... " SALMON, Supra note 26, at 139.
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Similarly, while BLE's empiricism is telling, absent a causal ex-
planation of how people act we will not know when and how much
the legal regime can shape behavior. As one philosopher of sci-
ence argued, "[w]e want to explain why bridges collapse to
discover how to prevent such occurrences in the future. We want
to explain why certain diseases occur in order to find out how to
cure them., 28 We also want a theory to explain the findings of BLE
because, assuming we normatively desire our society to be one in
pursuit of economics' goals, we can learn how to ensure that peo-
ple act rationally.
The second reason why theories are necessary is that theories
beget theories. The history of science demonstrates that one con-
crete idea leads to another. Creative minds examine posited truths
and use the framework of old paradigms to amend aged ideas and
generate new ones. The quantum hypothesis, for example, "was
originally formulated to explain a puzzle of radiation which had
long existed; but in the hands of Einstein it was soon applied to
explain the constitution of light and, in the hands of Niels Bohr, to
explain the structure of the atom.,
2 9
We want more theories because, as explained above, theories
help us to explain or, said otherwise, to determine causes. This in
turn enables us to cure diseases, shore up bridges, and guide hu-
man behavior. The more solutions we have for these and other
problems, the merrier.
The final reason, that theories facilitate reductionism, proves a
bit farfetched in its most absolute form. Strict reductionism aims to
deconstruct all sciences into one field. 30 The social sciences fold
into biology, biology to chemistry, chemistry to physics, and physics
to the ever-elusive general equation or theory. I Whether or not
the goals of this hard view of reductionism are realizable is not a
question for this Note. Nonetheless reductionism, perhaps a softer
28. SALMON, supra note 26, at 80.
29. MAX PLANK, WHERE IS SCIENCE GOING? 178 (1932).
30. See, e.g., STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1992).
31. See, e.g., Paul Oppenheim & Hillary Putnam, Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,
in 2 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND THE
MIND-BODY PROBLEM 3, 7 (Herbert FeigI et al. eds., 1958).
It is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may eventually be explained in
terms of the behavior of individual neurons in the brain; that the behavior of indi-
vidual cells-including neurons-may eventually be explained in terms of their
biochemical constitution; and that the behavior of molecules-including the macro-
molecules that make up living cells-may eventually be explained in terms of atomic
physics.
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view of it, explains why theories are so important. Take, for exam-
ple, phenomena that have common causes. Though these
occurrences may come from the same place, without a theory we
might not be able to recognize the shared ancestry. This inability
will in turn lead to inefficient responses to challenges these phe-
nomena propose.
Imagine two legal problems, A and B, which have a common
cause. Suppose we know the cause of A and accordingly how to
optimally correct for the problem so that it does not threaten our
desired scheme. Now, say we come across problem B. We know
what it is and what its effects are, but we do not know where it
comes from. We could either work backwards to find the roots of
B, take random stabs at solving it, or see if B's cause is similar to
any other posited explanation. If we recognize that A's theory suf-
ficiently explains where B comes from, we need not go through
the discovery process all over again. We can rely on the research
previously done about how to deal with A and apply it to B. Both
problems, given that they are reduced to a common cause, can be
dealt with through one policy.3 2 How does this apply to EA? If we
can reduce any of the irrational behaviors observed by BLE to the
same cause, such as a particular adaptive trait, then we may be able
to negate groups of cognitive biases through one policy.
Those who feel a theory is unnecessary might argue that this
theoretical and observational specificity counters simplicity. As-
suming arguendo that BLE and EA do threaten simplicity, note that
we will not always defer to them for an explanation. Admittedly,
when faced with explaining a particular behavior, law and econom-
ics is still the default paradigm because it sufficiently explains a
number of phenomena. We have relied on it in the past and
should continue to do so in the future. But where law and eco-
nomics wanes, as in those instances when BLE demonstrates that
law and economics' explanations do not fit the facts, we can use
EA along with the empiricism of BLE that supports EA theories as
an alternative explanatory tool. Under this scheme, we retain the
simplicity of law and economics in the majority of situations, but
rely on more complicated explanations when the simple ones fail
US.
That being said, let us examine how evolution applies to BLE.
Id. at 7.
32. One might say that, if A and B really do have common causes, dealing with A
would have resolved B in the first place. This is true, but in reality causes may not be identi-
cal but very similar.
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PART II. THE ROOTS OF AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION
With all the concepts that science offers, why is it that evolution
provides a promising explanation for cognitive shortcomings and
irrational behavior? The answer lies in the brain. BLE scholars
have noted that cognitive biases originate, among other things,
from bounded rationality.3 3 Formulated by Herbert Simon,
"[b]ounded rationality essentially captures the idea that there are
very real, very important constraints on the actual human capacity
to gather and process information." 4 For example, the brain, like a
computer, has speed and memory limits. 3 Because the brain can-
not perform an infinite number of computations in a finite time,
people cannot evaluate probabilities and assess risk in the manner
that expected utility demands.
Beyond this, the brain is bounded by another computational
limit. The brain performs algorithms-functions aimed at solving
problems. Unfortunately, the brain can only perform a limited
number of algorithms because, aside from the hardware limits of
speed and memory, the brain is constrained by its internal pro-
gramming or its software. It can only conduct certain tasks because
36it has only been coded to do particular things.
Where do these programs come from? The biologist's answer is
genetics. Genes, just like for an arm or a nose or (more aptly be-
cause it possesses its own program) embryonic development,
provide the schematics and commands that "form" the brain.
These genes code a programming selected for during evolution.
Essentially, "[t]he mind is a system of organs of computation, de-
signed by natural selection to solve the kinds of problems our
ancestors faced in their foraging way of life."" Consequently, it
contains only those algorithms necessary to solve problems hu-
mans and their genetic predecessors faced during the period of
33. Jolls et al., supra note 4, at 14.
34. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1150.
35. See, e.g., FRANK TIPPLER, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY 23 (1994). As an interest-
ing aside, some have attempted to define the limits of the brain's computational speed and
storage capacity. Frank Tippler estimates that the brain can store 1015 bits and runs at a
max of 10 teraflops (calculations per second). Today's fastest computers can match the
brain's storage capacity but clock in at "slow" 200 gigaflops. If, however, the rate at which
processing speed has grown remains constant, man made computers should become as fast
as the brain in less than a decade. Id.
36. See generally PINKER, supra note 18, at 21.
37. MATr RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 106
(1999).
38. PINKER, supra note 18, at 21.
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human physiological evolution)9 As a result, the brain is often un-
able to perform those calculations that do not correspond to a pre-
existing algorithm.40 When given a novel input, the brain will try to
process it via an established algorithm. This attempt may lead to a
"correct" answer in some instances but the "wrong" one in others.
Some of what BLE observes as irrational behavior are likely the
41results of those flawed responses.
Evolution, then, is a good theoretical basis for cognitive short-
comings because it, through the engine of natural selection,
formed the brain responsible for BLE's empirical data. This be-
comes clear when we realize that the algorithms our brain is
programmed to conduct result in behavior. Here, behavior is
broadly defined to include any response, physical or mental, the
body has to a stimulus that the brain (or its physiological analogs
like reflex loops) processes. In light of this, "all theories about be-
havior are ultimately theories about the human brain... [f] or our
actions inevitably reflect the brain's information processing pat-
terns, which in turn reflect its form and function., 43 Stated
otherwise, "[b]rain function reflects the evolutionary processes
that built the brain's intricate functionality. Therefore, behavior-
the principal output of the brain-reflects evolutionary proc-
,,44
esses.
This hypothesis can be explained in another way. A number of
evolutionary biologists argue "[t]he ultimate goal that the mind
[the programming of the brain] was designed to attain is maximiz-
ing the number of copies of the genes that created it." 45 Efficient
brains helped ensure that animals propagate their genes by en-
dowing an organism with those faculties it needed to stay alive in
the environment of evolutionary adaptation ("EEA"). A simple ex-
46ample is motor control . The brain can, thankfully, process a
stimulus and effect muscular contractions at a high speed. This
endowment is particularly important when attacked. The brain
quickly evaluates a situation and commands us to run or fight, thus
we have a better chance of staying alive. The same could be said of
hunting. The brain notes a prey and summarily directs our muscles
to attack. Because of this faculty, our hunter-gatherer ancestors not
39. Id.
40. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1164-74.
41. Id.
42. PINKER, supra note 18, at 25, 27.
43. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1143.
44. Id. at 1165.
45. PINKER, supra note 18, at 43. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE
(1976).
46. DAWKINS, supra note 45, at 52.
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only made it home at the end of the day, but put food on the table,
too.
The key is to recognize that those brains that possessed algo-
rithms capable of responding to selective pressures during human
evolution are those that brains possess today, because they facili-
tated gene replication via reproduction.47 Unfortunately these
same adaptations once necessary for survival do not always serve us
as optimally in the modern environment. Steven Pinker notes why:
For ninety-nine percent of human existence, people lived as
foragers in small nomadic bands. Our brains are adapted to
that long-vanished way of life, not to brand-new agricultural
and industrial civilizations.... Our ancestral environment
lacked the institutions that now entice us to nonadaptive
choices .... 4
For these reasons, while the motor skills humans developed in
the past are demonstrably still beneficial, some adaptations, like a
brain only capable of processing natural numbers (as noted be-
low), do not serve us well today.
A. Explaining Cognitive Biases and Heuristics
Because adaptations to past environments formed the brain, we
can see how our cognitive processes might not satisfy today's
thought requirements. Where the modern environment mirrors
that of the EEA, our brain may be fit to deal with a number of the
challenges of the past and of today. It is less able to deal, however,
with those current conditions that differ from the EEA.
Aside from traits maladapted to the modern environment or the
absence of algorithms that could never be selected for, the brain is
limited because the adaptations it does have do not embody the
best faculties.Y8 The reason why the human body is not ideal is that
47. PINKER, supra note 18, at 21 ("[The brain's programming] was shaped by natural
selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our ancestors in
most of our evolutionary history. The various problems for our ancestors were subtasks of
one big problem for their genes, maximizing the number of copies that made it into the
next generation.").
48. Id. at 42.
49. HENRY PLOTKIN, EVOLUTION IN MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTIONARY PSY-
CHOLOGY 12-13 (1998) ("Most adaptations ... are not nearly perfect-indeed some are
FALL 2002]
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imperfect adaptations provided enough fitness for us to get by and
reproduce. Our brain is a bounded computer because our genes
did not need a limitless supercomputer to replicate and propagate.
Far from perfection, the human body does the best it can with the
tools natural selection endowed.
Human optics provides a good example of an imperfect adapta-
tion. 0 When someone creates a television image for us to see, they
take an object and convert it into a retinal image that our eye ob-
serves as input. In order for us to then see the image, essentially
two things happen. First, our eyes attain the retinal projection,
and, second, the brain converts this retinal image into a visual one.
Sounds simple enough. The problem is that seeing (as opposed to
creating the image) is an inverse optics problem. While in produc-
ing an image, we reduce a visual to a permutation of colors, in
seeing, the brain has to somehow turn a permutation into an im-
age. Picture the similar problem with multiplication. "[I] t is easy to
multiply some numbers and announce the product, but impossible
to take a product and announce the numbers that were multiplied
to get it . ,51
How then does the brain take a random assortment of colors on
a television screen and convert it into an image? "The answer is
that the brain supplies the missing information, information about the
world we evolved in and how it reflects light. If the visual brain 'as-
sumes' that it is living in a certain kind of world ... it can make
good guesses about what is out there.' 52 In our math problem, it
would be as if we had a product, wanted to find out the multipliers,
and knew that only prime numbers could be factored in our world.
We would decipher that 339 is the product of 3 and 113. The same
is true with vision. If we know that the world consists of certain
colors and shapes, we can probably make guesses as to what made
the retinal image.
The brain's ability to see is not as straightforward as it could be.
We could just "see" what we see instead of converting an image
with the help of our perceptive heuristic. Moreover, because the
brain relies on an assumption it developed during the EEA, when
an input does not represent something that fits within our under-
standing of how light reflects off objects or depth perception, we
may not perceive it.53 That is why we have a hard time seeing in
quite a long way from perfection, and a competent engineer would have designed some-
thing much more suitable.").
50. This example is taken from PINKER, supra note 18, at 28.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 29.
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multiple dimensions. The mathematics allegory would be living in
a world using prime numbers and then trying to figure out which
primes multiply out to 1000.
As in the optics example, many of our cognitive processes are
rooted in an imperfect evolutionary adaptation that cannot nego-
tiate novel and unfamiliar tasks. The remainder do not embody
"rational" thought because these algorithms could never be se-
lected for. This history explains what today appear as cognitive
biases. To better understand these limitations, "we need to look at
the structure of the environment and the types of tasks that hu-
mans have faced throughout their history of evolution"54 and
compare them against the tasks we are faced with today. Where the
environment and tasks between the two eras have diverged, the
tools with which natural selection endowed us may preclude be-
havior that is rational in the purest economic sense. And where, as
with the optics example, an adaptation that is actually beneficial
and selected for in the EEA has limits, these bounds persist today.
Below are three evolutionary explanations to cognitive shortcom-
ings that utilize this analysis.
1. Owen Jones and Time-Shifted Rationality-Professor Owen
Jones believes in the promise of evolutionary analysis and the law.55
Jones, in contrast to BLE scholars and economics, refuses to char-
acterize human behavior that is inconsistent with economic theory
as irrational.56 Instead, he argues that some of the behavior viewed
as irrational today was very rational during the EEA. The only rea-
son that the behavior observed by BLE seems "wrong" is that
humans are responding to stimulus in the manner they would have
during the EEA. In this sense, some cognitive biases are likely the
result of evolutionary adaptations that were once rational but are
maladapted to today's challenges.57
The "temporal mismatch of historically adaptive behavior and
modern environments" is what Jones terms "time-shifted rational-
ity.' 'ss Specifically, time-shifted rationality describes "any trait
54. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 928.
55. Jones, Tine, supra note 16; see also Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in the Law:
An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafterJones,
Child Abuse].
56. Jones means "irrational" in the sense commonly used by traditional economics,
i.e., making choices that do not conform with expected utility theory or the rational actor
model. SeeJones, Time, supra note 16, at 1141.
57. See also KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS RATIONAL?: STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFER-
ENCES IN REASONING 148-52 (1999) (detailing prior literature that discusses the distinction
between evolutionary rationality and normative rationality).
58. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1172.
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resulting from the operation of evolutionary processes on brains
that, while increasing the probability of behavior that was adaptive
in the [EEA], leads to substantively irrational or maladaptive be-
havior in the present environment."5 9 Using time-shifted rationality
as his lens, Jones examines a number of cognitive biases to show
that they might be products of behavior that improved fitness dur-
ing natural selection. He notes, for example, that the inconsistent
preferences exhibited by a dieter who eats ice cream reflect an evo-
lution-driven proclivity to high caloric foods.0 In doing so, he
demonstrates that inconsistent preferences may arise when an evo-
lutionary tendency, a preference for calories, conflicts with
modern environmental factors-the overabundance of high ca-
loric foods.
One of Jones' more plausible evolutionary arguments comes
from his discussion of over-cooperativeness. 6' Why, for example, do
people leave tips when they travel on the road? Jones proffers that
such behavior results from the adaptiveness of reciprocal altru-
ism. 62 During the EEA humans lived in small communities. In
those groupings, each member relied on one another such that
each individual knew if she scratched someone's back, he would
later do the same for her. Jones contends that this behavior is pre-
disposed because those who practiced reciprocal altruism were
63best fit to survive during selection. The "reciprocal altruism gene"
passed on to modem times and is still active. We still scratch oth-
ers' backs because the forces that formed our brains compel us to
believe they will do the same for us despite the fact that reciprocity
is unlikely in today's expansive communities.
Jones also explains that some behavior that goes against ex-
pected utility theory occurs because there was never an
opportunity in hominid evolution for the "rational" behavior to be
selected for.64 Perhaps it is best to properly discount futures, but
how would hunter-gatherers ever have to consistently consider the
value of goods months or years ahead of time? During the EEA the
only apparent goods were likely foodstuffs and land. Land was not
scarce so our ancestors did not have to be concerned about toiling
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1175.
61. Id. at 1176.
62. Reciprocal altruism involves "symbiotic relationships of mutual benefit." DAWKINS,
supra note 45, at 196. Stated otherwise, reciprocal altruism embodies the principle of "You
scratch my back, I'll scratch yours." Id. at 179. For more on reciprocal altruism, see, for
example, id. at 196-202; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REv.
BIOLOGY 35 (1971).
63. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1176-77.
64. Id. at 1166, 1174-75.
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a field to the point of future infertility. Meat could not be held
onto for later times because it would spoil without curing or re-
frigeration. Efficiently considering future costs was not necessary
because limited resources or the tragedy of the commons never
presented a challenge . As a result, conditions never selected for a
brain with the capacity to discount futures.
Jones' propositions are compelling but imprecise. He speaks in
generalities and does not explain all cognitive biases. He, however,
does not see this as a flaw. From his perspective "the examples
were intended first to suggest the general contours of how a time-
shifted rationality analysis might proceed and, second, to provide a
sufficient sense of plausibility to warrant further future explora-
tion." 6 Jones clearly accomplishes both of these tasks. Others who
likely support Jones' propositions proffer more concrete evidence
of the evolutionary basis for cognitive errors. Two examples are
discussed below.
2. Rode and Wang: Risk-Sensitive Foraging Theory and Cognitive Bi-
ases-As one might expect, the ability to obtain sufficient nutrition
embodies a particularly salient example of fitness. Relying on this
assumption, Catrin Rode and X.T. Wang argue that the ambiguity
effect and the framing effect can be explained as modern manifes-
tations of adaptive thinking that aided our ancestors to find food.'
7
"The ambiguity effect occurs when people choose an option for
which the probability information is explicitly stated over one for
which it is either imprecise or lacking, even though both have the
same expected utility."68 The traditional example of this is when
subjects are asked whether they want to select a ball from a box
containing 50 black balls and 50 white balls or containing 100
black and white balls in an unknown composition when they know
they will get money for choosing a black ball.69 Although the payoff
for both under expected utility theory is the same, people prefer
to select from the 50/50 box.
65. For further discussion on this point, see E. Donald Elliot, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17, 22 (2001)
("[W]hen human populations are small and environmental resources are plentiful, a 'fron-
tier mentality' typically develops that shows little or no concern for preserving natural
resources and managing the environment.").
66. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1185.
67. Rode & Wang, supra note 3.
68. Id. at 927.
69. See id. at 929 (summarizing the works of Camerer & Weber and Curley, Yates, &
Abrams).
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Rode and Wang explain that this choice results from a particular
algorithm that would have been adaptive during the EEA.7 0 This
mental process has been termed by others as "risk-sensitive forag-
ing theory."7' Rode and Wang ask us to imagine an animal that
needs 250 calories and who can forage in one of two patches. Each
of these patches has the same expected payoff of 250 calories, but
differ in the variability of expected payoff. One, by analogy, is the
50/50 box while the other is the "unknown" box. Risk-foraging
theory predicts that an animal would seek food in the 50/50 patch
because it will "more likely" offer the 250 calories. While the high
variance patch may provide less than a 50/50 chance to get 250
calories, under expected utility theory, it would not offer greater
than a 50 percent chance. Animals will tend to go where they will
get the food they need. The brain that coded for this response
likely propagated via natural selection.
Altering the caloric requirement supports this hypothesis. 2 If an
animal could seek food in the same patches discussed above but
needs 300 calories, where would it go? Since 250 calories are no
longer enough, the 50/50 patch will not do because a one-in-two
chance at getting 250 calories is insufficient to satisfy the 300-
calorie minimum. In theory, a forager would choose the ambigu-
ous, high-variance patch because there it may be possible, no
matter how unlikely, to get 300 calories.
Rode and Wang demonstrated this effect empirically by playing
the ball game with varying minimum requirements. 3 Subjects had
to select ten balls from either box. "[P]articipants preferred the
high-variability ambiguous option when the required number of
black balls exceeded the expected number of black balls of the
low-variability option ... and they selected the low-variance option
when the minimum requirement was below the expected num-
ber.
,7 4
This application of risk-foraging theory to the ambiguity effect
shows that humans consider the expected payoff of variable op-
tions, the variability of possible outcomes, and current need when
making choices. Thus, the ambiguity effect is not a cognitive bias.
5
Instead it is a sensible algorithm that enabled adequate nutrition
70. Id. at 929-31.
71. See, e.g., DAVID W. STEPHENS &JOHN R. KREBS, FORAGING THEORY 128-150 (1986).
72. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 930.
73. Id. at 930-31. This study is reported in full in C. Rode et al., When and Why Do Peo-
pie Avoid Unknown Probabilities in Decisions Under Uncertainty ?: Testing Some Theories from
OptimalForaging Theory, 72 COGNITION 269 (1999).
74. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 931.
75. Id. at 928.
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during the EEA.76 This faculty continues to express itself today; un-
fortunately, for economists, this behavior disturbs their forecasts.
Rode and Wang also provide an evolutionary explanation for
the framing effect.7 Kahneman and Tversky used the Asian disease
problem to demonstrate that people's preferences varied based on
how outcomes were phrased.78 In this problem, subjects were asked
to choose between two responses to a disease outbreak that in-
fected 600 people: Plan A would save a third of the infected for
certain, while instituting plan B would provide a one-third chance
that all would survive and a two-thirds probability that all would
die. A majority of subjects chose plan A. Others had to select from
outcomes framed in terms of death: Plan A would kill two-thirds
for sure while under Plan B there was a one-third probability that
no one would die and a two-thirds chance they all would die. Here,
respondents preferred plan B.
Rode and Wang (based on Wang's previous research) 79 noted
that the framing effect was context dependent on the number of
people infected.80 Wang repeated the Asian disease experiments
but varied the number of infected to 6000, 600, 60 and 6. He dis-
covered that preferences were inconsistent in the 6000 and 600
hypotheticals but not in the 60 and 6 problems. In the smaller
group sizes, the participants consistently chose the unknown out-
comes (Plan B solutions) regardless of how the alternatives were
framed. The most consistent choices came when the group of six
was identified as kin.
Why the indirect correlation between uniformity and the num-
ber infected? Rode and Wang rely on society size during the EEA
to provide an answer. Humans lived in small groups of roughly
twenty-five kin in the EEA. "[The framing effect] only occurred in
the evolutionary novel large-group contexts but disappeared in
evolutionary typical small-group contexts. These findings suggest
that people pay more attention to verbal cues ... when ecologi-
cally more valid decision cues are absent."
81
76. Id. at 931.
77. Id. at 931-35. The framing effect demonstrates a reversal in risk preference de-
pendant upon how choices are phrased. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversy, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
78. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 77, at 453.
79. X.T. Wang & V. Johnston, Perceived Social Context and Risk Preference: A Reexamination
of Framing Effects in a Life-Death Decision Problem, 8J. BEHAV. DECiSiON MAKING 279 (1995).
80. Rode & Wang, supra note 3, at 933.
81. Id.
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This is consonant with microevolution. Selfish gene theory notes
that evolution involves the survival of genes.8 2 This result can be
achieved not only in saving yourself to ensure your genes propa-
gate through reproduction, but also in protecting your kin who
possess a certain percentage of genes in common with you that
they can pass on.83 If kin survive and reproduce, they too will pass
on "your" genes. 4 Accordingly, the goal is to enable the greatest
number of kin to live. In hominid societies, it was likely necessary
that for the greatest number of kin to survive a critical mass always
had to be alive. (This is because survival often depended on com-
mon defense or delegation of work, i.e., hunting versus raising
children.) This resonates with risk-sensitive foraging theory. Hav-
ing a critical mass likely improves access to food. As a result, a live-
or-die mentality developed.
This explains the consistent choices in the smaller-group con-
text Asian disease problem. In the past, nature selected for those
brains with an algorithm that either understood problems possible
in the EEA, or took risks to keep the population above the critical
mass. We still possess that hard-wiring today, so it affects our
choices and generates the behavior that BLE observes.
3. The Base-Rate Fallacy and Natural Numbers85-The last
evolutionary explanation of a cognitive bias this paper discusses is
likely the most well-known. The base-rate fallacy asserts that people
cannot calculate probabilities correctly. This cognitive flaw no
doubt strikes at the core of economics because a rational actor
needs to assess probabilities to comprehend expected utilities.
The study frequently cited to demonstrate the base-rate fallacy is
Casscells' survey of Harvard Medical School doctors and fourth-
year students. 6 In this experiment, subjects were asked to calculate
the rate of false positives for a medical test when background in-
formation was presented as percentages. Under these conditions,
only eighteen percent came up with the correct Bayesian answer.
82. See generally DAWKINS, supra note 45, at 13-21.
83. Id. at 95-116.
84. Id. at 101. This is termed kin-selection.
85. This discussion draws from GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING 57-125
(2000) and Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All?
Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58 COGNITION 1
(1996). Note, however, the distinction between Jones, Rode & Wang, and Gigerenzer. The
first two describe how behavior deemed today as irrational actually developed because of a
divergence between evolutionary shaped behavior and modern environments. The latter
discusses how choices and decision-making processes that seem irrational really are not
errors at all.
86. Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results, 299
NEW ENG.J. MED. 999 (1978).
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Based on this study some have asserted that the human brain has a
cognitive incapacity to calculate probabilities. Gigerenzer as well as
Cosmides and Tooby, however, independently showed that the
brain is completely able to conduct Bayesian calculations.87 Each
rehashed Casscells' study but instead proffered information in fre-
quencies. Both found that when presented with background
information in natural numbers, humans calculated the Bayesian
88
answer.
The natural number studies explained the difference in out-
come from an evolutionary perspective. Cosmides and Tooby do so
succinctly:
Reliable numerical statements about single event probabilities
were rare or nonexistent in the Pleistocene.... In our natural
environment, the only database available from which one
could inductively reason was one's own observations.... No
organism can evolve cognitive mechanisms designed to rea-
son about, or receive as input, information in a format that
did not regularly exist.89
Because humans did not encounter probabilities in nature,
pressure in the EEA could not have selected for a brain that
processed probabilities. On the other hand, humans often came
across frequencies. Frequencies, after all, are a product of everyday
observations. This reality explains the base-rate fallacy through the
insight of evolution.
B. The Value of Explaining BLE's Findings
The examples from the previous section all take stabs at
applying the theory of evolution to explain the findings of
behavioral studies. This Note already spoke of the value in
theorizing the observations of behavioral economics and
behavioral law and economics. Theories, as noted above, can
identify causes and accordingly generate possible solutions. In the
history of science, theories led to the creation of other ideas. And
finally, theories help to reduce seemingly independent
observations to a single origin.
87. GIGERENZER, supra note 85; Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 85.
88. GIGERENZER, supra note 85; Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 85.
89. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 85, at 15.
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The value of identifying causes cannot be overstated. As
discussed earlier, absent a theory, BLE is a catalogue of
observations. While this list may aid us to predict what may happen
in those situations previously observed, BLE on its own cannot tell
us what will occur in novel circumstances. "Empirical observation
alone could serve as the basis for predicting behavior only if every
possible future situation could be observed ex ante either in the
real world or in a laboratory. ' 9° Professor Russell Korobkin
provides a brief example. Say we observe a man found guilty and
punished for stealing an apple.9 ' What will happen when someone
steals an orange? We can make no prediction based on the first
observation because we do not know if the court is punishing
stealing or the possession of apples. Only when we decipher the
court's motivation-the cause for the conviction-can we
hypothesize about the implications of the orange theft.
There is other value in explaining the root of cognitive biases.
Clearly, the main goal of evolutionary analysis and the law would
be the same one the legal system holds today-to generate rules
effective at guiding behavior. Note that when we form legal rules
we operate with base assumptions of how humans act. But "if we
premise legal policy on the assumption that people behave ration-
ally, and if their behavior too systematically proves otherwise, then
the desired results of our legal rules may not follow. 9 2 In order to
properly direct behavior we need to know in which ways we need
to manipulate it. If we know that people are not rational, as EA
and BLE together demonstrate, we know that our legal regimes
should not favor rules that presume human rationality.
The evolutionary roots of irrationality can also offer insight as to
whether we can correct biases. As Thomas Ulen points out, "I hope
that [BLE] will soon address.., the distinction between ingrained
cognitive limitations and those that are not hard-wired into us and
are therefore subject to behavioral modification.... If natural se-
lection has hard-wired our brains for a particular cognitive
limitation ... then we probably cannot fully escape those limita-
tions. "03 This idea resonates with our discussion of human sight.
94
Recall the assumptions the brain makes when we see. This capacity
is surely hard-wired. As a result, the "cheat-sheet is so deeply
90. Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Be-
havioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICSJ. 319, 328 (2001).
91. Id. at 327-28.
92. Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1153.
93. Thomas Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REv.
1747, 1760 (1998).
94. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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imbedded in the operation of our visual brain that we cannot erase
the assumptions written on it."05 In recognizing this, when we want
someone to see in another dimension, we do not work against the
hard-wiring. Instead, we try and work with or around it. If EA can
define the bounds of hard-wired behavior, we will either realize
that they are inevitable or we can devise legal correctives that, by
circumventing our brain's program, may properly respond to irra-
tionality.
96
Identifying causes more centrally challenges our ability to
unlearn cognitive shortcomings because "learning is not a sur-
rounding gas or force field, and it does not happen by magic. It is
made possible by innate machinery designed to do the learning.,
97
Information on what limitations evolution imposes on the brain
also highlights how and what we can learn. Where a bias cannot be
deprogrammed with education that operates within the brain's
bounds, it will persist.
C. Critiques of Evolutionary Analysis
A wave of criticism attempts to discredit the predictive power
and value of EA. By and large they reduce to one argument: EA is
not a true science because its predictions can never be proved or
discredited.99 This line of argument recasts the responses to socio-
biology posited in the 1970s.' Today, these criticisms mainly come
from cognitive psychologists and biologists.
BLE's Jeffrey Rachlinski criticizes EA 00  He notes that
evolutionary analysis and the law can never be complete because
we do not know enough about the EEA.' ' The fossil record is too
sparse and does not contain any information on behavior or our
95. PINKER, supra note 18, at 29.
96. Jones describes our ability to correct an irrational adaptation with his "law of law's
leverage." Jones, Time, supra note 16, at 1190. This principle states, "The magnitude of legal
intervention necessary to reduce or to increase the incidence of any human behavior will
correlate positively or negatively, respectively, with the extent to which a predisposition
contributing to that behavior was adaptive for its bearers, on average in past environments."
Id.
97. PINKER, supra note 18, at 33.
98. See, e.g.,JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Comment, Is Evolutionary Analysis of Law Science or Sto-
rytelling, 41JURIMETRICSJ. 365 (2001).
99. Gould's responses to E.O. Wilson were the most evident of these. See, e.g., StevenJ.
Gould, Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 16, 1978, at 530.
100. Rachlinski, supra note 98.
101. Id. at 366-67.
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ancestral environment. Absent this knowledge, evolutionary
scientists cannot reasonably decipher what cognitive processes and
behavior could be selected for. In light of this ambiguity,
evolutionary explanations can never be tested and are, therefore,
unscientific."2 Rachlinski further asserts that the allure to EA lies
in its "scientific pedigree" because EA's "close connection to
biology lends it the gloss of empiricism and theoretical rigor that
the hard sciences enjoy. ' '10 3
Richard Lewontin, a distinguished biologist and critic of socio-
biology, shares Rachlinski's views on evolutionary explanations. 10 4
Although he never replied to EA directly, his writings evidence his
beliefs. Lewontin writes, "whole books have been written making
claims about the actual course of human cognitive evolu-
tion .... [s]ome of these speculations might be true, but we don't
know... how we would go about finding out."1 0 5 He reasons so be-
cause "[d]espite the existence of a vast and highly developed
mathematical theory of evolutionary processes in general, despite
the abundance of knowledge about living and fossil primates, de-
spite the intimate knowledge that we have of our own [species], we
know essentially nothing about the evolution of our cognitive ca-
pabilities .... ,106 Stephen J. Gould agrees and terms most all
evolutionary explanations for human cognition 'Just-so stories.",
0 7
Russell Korobkin adds to the critique. He points out that the
imprecision of evolutionary arguments is indicative of any motiva-
tional theory.' 8 All motivational explanations are driven by their
underlying hypothesis.'0 9 If X represents the theory, "[f]rom that
postulate, one can deduce predictions about how individuals will
behave in a variety of contexts: because their goal is X, people will
take the necessary steps to achieve X ... .""' Korobkin argues that
this method has two faults: motivational theories (1) can predict
102. Id. at 366.
103. Id.
104. Lewonfin's views, along with Wilson's, are discussed in detail in ULLICA SEGER-
STRALE, DEFENDERS OF THE TRUTH: THE BATTLE FOR SCIENCE IN THE SOCIOBIOLOGY
DEBATE AND BEYOND 35-53 (2000).
105. Richard C. Lewontin, The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer, in 4
AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCES: METHODS, MODELS, AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 107,
108 (Don Scarborough & Saul Steinberg eds., 1995).
106. Id. at 108-09.
107. Stephen J. Gould, Sociobiology and Human Nature, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED 288
(Ashley Montagu ed., 1980).
108. Korobkin, supra note 90, at 321.
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110. Korobkin, supra note 90, at 320.
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multiple and opposing behaviors and (2) those predictions it does
make are incorrect."'
Another critical assessment of evolutionary explanations posits
that even if a complete fossil record were found, the elaborations
in culture make it impossible to score adaptation to the EEA with
modern behavior."12 "[Culture has] increased the 'distance' be-
tween our primate heritages and our life; [cultural developments]
seem to have countermanded our primate heritage, as with toler-
ance to homosexuality, voluntary or mandated birth control, or
the popularity of risky thrill-seeking activities."" 3 This space con-
founds any explanation because the relationship between today's
behavior, as generated by cultural practices, and biology may not
exist. This fact, when coupled with the incomplete evidence and
limited empirical testing, forces a number of theorists to discount
EA all together. They contend it is an abstract and unfounded ex-
ercise that cannot be concretely supported.
D. Responses to the Criticism
While on their face the criticisms of evolutionary analysis seem
valid, they eventually fail for three reasons. First, they undervalue
unproven scientific explanations. Second, these criticisms ignore
that a responsible scientific method can ensure EA's statements are
neither Gould's 'Just-so stories" nor, as Korobkin holds, internally
inconsistent. And finally, they discount that scientific advance-
ments are generating new tools that provide a better evidentiary
foundation for evolutionary analysis.
Rachlinski, in focusing on the lack of evidence to support EA,
misunderstands the nature of science. "4 True, by and large, scien-
tific explanations have concrete evidence. That is, after all, what
many scientists will argue distinguishes science from philosophy
and religion. Even assuming arguendo that EA is short on evidence,
Rachlinski ignores that "even unproved theory can be useful in
analyzing legal issues."' In fact, the cathedral of science houses a
number of theories widely accepted as either truth or of essential
111. Id.at321.
112. Paul Rozin, Evolution and Adaption in the Understanding of Behavior Culture, and the
Mind, 43 As,. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 970,976 (2000).
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
115. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Comment, Can Evolutionary Science Contribute to Discussions of
Law?, 41JURIMETRICSJ. 379, 380 (2001).
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value that are supported by what Rachlinski, Lewontin, and Gould
would consider untenable or incomplete proof.
An example comes from studies of the origin of the universe.
Astrophysics and cosmology use the behavior and constitution of
particles to form theories of the big bang, black holes, and the life
cycles of celestial bodies. A vast number of tools essentially compile
archaeological data of light and other forms of energy radiated
billions of years ago. This evidence is coupled with the nature of
particles today to prospect on a number of principles.
Despite all of this, do we really know anything about the envi-
ronment in which the universe formed or that the laws of physics
remained constant throughout time? Our knowledge of this state is
even less than that of our environment's past. Nonetheless, astro-
physicists that most all revere are rarely discredited as 'just-so-ists".
In fact, many consider their ruminations some of the most intellec-
tually commendable in modern science.
The philosopher and physicist Richard Morris makes broader
sense of the nature of science when he wonders how to distinguish
between science and just-so stories. 1 6 Among other things, Morris
asserts, "[t] he difference between scientific and crackpot theories
does not have much to do with experimental confirmation....
There have been many scientific theories which could not be sub-
jected to experimental tests until years or decades had passed."' 1 7
He cites Newton's law of gravity and Einstein's theories of relativity
as two prominent examples."8
The same could be said of EA. While it seems strange to parallel
evolutionary explanation to Newton's and Einstein's fundamental
theories, the analogy makes it clear that what Rachlinski perceives
in EA as a lack of evidentiary support hardly obviates it as an intel-
lectually commanding force. If we really hope to discredit EA, we
have to prove it untrue by uprooting its assumptions or specifically
disproving its theories, not by broadly asserting there is nothing to
it. This statement takes note that "[t]he boldness of asking deep
questions may require unforeseen flexibility if we are to accept the
answers."1 9 This flexibility may include a tempered skepticism and
an opportunity to investigate a theory before a speedy rejection.
Korobkin's criticism, as well as that of those who fear 'just-so
stories," can be addressed by ensuring that a defined scientific
116. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 138-39.
117. Id. at 139.
118. Id.
119. GREENE, supra note 27, at 108.
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method is used in evolutionary analysis. Doing so can weed out
unlikely explanations. Steven Pinker articulates one such method.
A good adaptationist explanation needs the fulcrum of an
engineering analysis that is independent of the part of the
mind we are trying to explain. The analysis begins with a goal
to be attained and a world of causes and effects in which to at-
tain it, and goes on to specify what kinds of designs are better
suited to attain it than others ....
Once we have a spec sheet for a well-designed mind, we can
see whether Homo sapiens has that kind of mind. We do the
experiments ... to get the facts down about a mental faculty,
and then see whether the faculty meets the specs: whether it
shows signs of precision, complexity, efficiency, reliability, and
specialization in solving its assigned problem .... "'
It is the same method of reverse engineering that we use in
other fields. Pinker shows how this method has been successfully
used. 121
Essentially, a method that supports precision defends those ex-
planations that find a complex adaptation where an intuitively
good fit between the trait and the environment exists, and power-
ful and pervasive selection pressures for the trait were present.
Consequently, we can discredit those explanations that violate this
rule. It is silly, for example, to say that the evolutionary basis for
why men do not ask for directions is that in the past approaching a
stranger or showing poor confidence would have ended in death.
Finally, those critics who chide EA for a lack of evidence ignore
that support for a theory can come after its exposition. It is clear
that as science progresses, evolutionary scientists attain better tools
and facts with which to explain or prove their hypotheses. For ex-
ample, the deciphering of the genome will no doubt lead to a
better understanding of evolution. As Matt Ridley prospects:
[R]ound and round the theories we go in a spiral of comfort-
ing justification, proving how we came to be as we are. We
have built a scientific house of cards on the flimsiest founda-
tions of evidence, but we have reason to believe that it will
one day be testable. The fossil record will tell us only a little
120. PINKER, supra note 18, at 38.
121. Cosmides & Tooby used a similar method in their study on the evolutionary basis
for the base-rate fallacy. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 85, at 14.
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about behaviour; the bones are too dry and random to speak.
But the genetic record will tell us more."'
Additionally, while useful in and of itself, understanding the
human genome will lead to other information, such as phyloge-
netic evidence,12 3 that will aid evolutionary researchers.
24
The value of unproven theories, the use of a refined scientific
method, and the promise of new discoveries all oppose an early
discarding of EA. Evolutionary explanations as they stand may very
well posit a number of untenable hypotheses, but a responsible
and more advanced approach will render EA a consistently valid
predictor of behavior.
PART III: EA IN ACTION
EA aids in the formulation and application of law and regulating
schemes. Law, as noted above, seeks to guide behavior. To be able
to monitor and direct how people act, law and policy makers need
to understand what motivates individual decisions. Law and eco-
nomics, with its focus on incentives, elucidates this phenomenon.
It carefully analyzes how people will react to regulations. Where
the response is favorable, law and economics supports the legal
policy.
The problem with law and economics is that it incorrectly pre-
dicts how people will behave. Given this inadequacy, its utility is
limited because those policies the economic model supports are
falsely grounded. Stated otherwise, "[e]very legal regime has, as its
fulcrum, a behavioral model that purports to describe causal influ-
ences on law-relevant behavior.', 125 Deductively, "[t]he law can
obtain no more leverage on that behavior than the solidity of that
behavioral model affords.' '2 6 Where the law presumes that a behav-
ior is the result of a causal mechanism which is inaccurate (e.g.,
traditional cost-benefit analysis) or makes false assumptions of how
people will act (e.g., negotiate a right away given what economics
considers sufficient compensation), its ability to moderate behav-
ior will wane. As noted above, EA can help by identifying probable
122. RIDLEY, supra note 37, at 35.
123. See, e.g., PAUL H. HARVEY & MARK D. PAGEL, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN Evo-
LUTIONARY BIOLOGY (1991).
124. See RIDLEY, supra note 37, at 35. See also PLOTKIN, supra note 49, at 215.
125. Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Preven-
tion, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 933 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Biology of Rape].
126. Id.
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human behavior in those situations where law and economics, par-
ticularly as noted by BLE, is inaccurate. In doing so, EA will lead to
more effective legal regimes.
A. Jones on Child Abuse and Rape
Professor Owen Jones, briefly discussed in Part II, is the most
vocal proponent of modern evolutionary analysis and its applica-
tion to law, specifically rape and child abuse.12' His works articulate
a particular procedure through which EA can be conducted to
help reform current approaches to legal problems. 12 In general,
Jones notes:
A legal system informed by evolutionary analysis might more
precisely target, regulate, or otherwise control the existence
of, or access to, newly identified associated environmental fac-
tors. If environmental factor x increases the likelihood that
people in a given society will exhibit behavior y, then one
strategy law may pursue to reduce y is to reduce the preva-
lence of x.... A legal system informed by evolutionary
analysis might also design programs that take account of
evolved motivational links between environmental stimuli and
behavior by narrowly tailoring legal regimes to interrupt or
weaken them. This could involve invoking the panoply of
tools available to society, such as social or educational pro-
grams targeted at those most likely to experience the stimuli,
incentive programs, or refocused deterrence initiatives.
12 9
Jones, relying on prior research,' ° noted that child abuse-in
particular infanticide-could be explained by a lack of emotion
felt by the abuser toward the victim. While this declaration might
seem a bit obvious, Jones arrives at this conclusion after a careful
evolutionary analysis. Jones focuses in part on Discriminative Pa-
rental Solicitude (DPS) Theory.13' DPS holds that:
127. Id.;Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 55.
128. See, e.g.,Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 55, at 1157.
129. Id. at 1232-33.
130. Id. at 1181 n.170.
131. Id. at 1176.
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The precise allocation of a parent's investment among related
and unrelated infants is ... acutely sensitive to the "opportu-
nity cost" of that investment. Natural selection effectively
punishes the genetic complements of parents that allocate
parental investment in one way whenever similarly situated
competitors earn greater fitness returns by allocating the same
amount of parental investment in another way-to different
existing or future offspring, for example. Thus, natural selec-
tion will favor the ability to deliver parental investment to the
offspring most capable of turning that investment into repro-
ductive success. This theory therefore predicts that the
motivational mechanisms influencing parental behavior will
have evolved in such a way that parents will, on average, act as
if they value a particular infant in direct proportion to that in-
fant's probable contribution to parental inclusive fitness. 1
2
According to this paradigm, Jones hypothesizes that victims of
child abuse will likely be unrelated to the abuser, or, if related, will
occur where care for a child is deemed "inefficient" through the
lens of reproductive fitness.1 33 Jones compiles information to show
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1178. Given the import of such an assertion, it seems an appropriate time to
remind the reader of the naturalistic fallacy. This concept directs that simply because evolu-
tion states a prediction, these forecasts come attached with no normative conclusions. For
example, while DPS might predict that harming children is sometimes favorable with re-
spect to both inclusive and reproduction fitness, we should not conclude that child abuse is
acceptable. It is, in fact, more than clear that it is not. Also, simply because behavior is in part
influenced by genes, it does not excuse an actor of responsibility or hold that culture plays
no role in human actions. See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 18, at 46-47.
Another way to come to the naturalistic fallacy is to return to micro-evolution and selfish
gene theory. See DAWKINS, supra note 45. Recall that evolution is about genes replicating
themselves and not about human reproduction per se. Accordingly,
the gene-centered theory of evolution does not imply that the point of all human
striving is to spread our genes.... People don't selfishly spread their genes; genes
selfishly spread themselves. They do it by the way they build our brains. By making us
enjoy life ... the genes buy a lottery ticket for representation in the next generation,
with odds that were favorable in the environment in which we evolved....
Sexual desire is not people's strategy to propagate their genes. It's people's strategy to
attain the pleasures of sex.... Just as blueprints don't necessarily specify blue build-
ings, selfish genes don't necessarily specify selfish organisms."
PINKER, supra note 18, at 43-44.
While our genes may hope we act in a particular way, should that method be immoral or
grate against societal norms, its commands must be escaped. As Dawkins notes, "We, alone
on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators." DAWKINS, supra note 45, at
215.
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that the data are largely (often overwhelmingly) consistent with
predictions based on DPS theory.
3 4
Professor Jones goes on to show how this evolutionary insight
can be integrated with or amend traditional views of child abuse to
yield more precise and effective prevention measures. The insight
of DPS, for example, modifies current behavioral models.3 5 This
reformulation presents options for new legal strategies to alleviate
child abuse. Jones notes how present models of child abuse ar-
gue that the behavioral disposition to harm children is learned.'
3 7
Accordingly, legal responses focus on things such as public aware-
ness and parent education programs.3 8 EA, however, claims that
reforms that take note of evolutionary predictions can better re-
spond to abuse. Since, for example, stepparents are more likely to
feel less solicitude towards their stepchildren and consequently
abuse them, perhaps resources might be better directed to focus
on prevention or monitoring abuse within this group."9 Courts
might also focus on deterring abuse by providing a heightened
legal standard for stepparents or, in a custody battle, award care to
biological parents.'4
Jones approaches rape from a similar perspective. Perhaps
"natural and sexual selection have operated over long periods of
evolutionary history to preserve and spread psychological predis-
positions, in males, to correlate psychological states tending to
increase the likelihood of forceful copulation with circumstances
that would, on average, have made forced copulation more adap-
tive than alternative behaviors during the environment of
evolutionary adaptation.' 4' After a detailed analysis, Jones notes
how this evolutionary phenomenon can modify the current dis-
course on rape.
134. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 55, at 1193-1211.
135. Id. at 1227.
136. Id. at 1232.
137. Id. at 1233.
138. See id. (listing a number of current responses aimed at curbing child abuse).
139. Id. at 1234.
140. Id. at 1235. Jones proffers other examples as well. In doing so, he admits that "the
spectrum of possible legal strategies informed by evolutionary analysis can range from the
most restrictive and absurd, such as outlawing divorce, to the least restrictive and passive....
Between will often lie plausible and achievable strategies that, combined with other efforts,
may significantly improve a society's ability to achieve its established goals." Id.
141. Jones, Biology of Rape, supra note 125, at 910. In light of the naturalistic fallacy dis-
cussed at note 133, Jones also carefully notes that "[i]t does not follow ... that rape is
inevitable.... It does not follow that the legal system should be less aggressive about pre-
venting rape .... It does not follow that accused rapists should be allowed to raise biology
in furtherance of exculpatory arguments, claiming that male evolved psychology absolves
them from guilt." Id. at 910-11.
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One category that should be reconsidered is the understanding
of what motivates rapists. ProfessorJones writes:
There is simply a great deal of evidence, consistent with nar-
row, falsifiable, and parsimonious predictions, derived from
robust foundations of behavioral biology, suggesting that rape
is frequently influenced, at least in part, by nonrandom, con-
text-specific, information-processing predispositions typical to
the male brain of many species, including humans. This evi-
dence neither excuses rape when it does occur, nor makes
rape determined or inevitable. But it may very well mean that
the popular hypothesis that most rape is a product of misogy-
nistic animus. . . is overcredited1
42
In light of this, Jones argues that the now defunct Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),143 which attempted to provide
a private remedy for acts of violence motivated by gender, may not
afford the most effective response to rape.1" He also adds that legal
regimes should recognize the evolutionary underpinnings of
rape-particularly the behavioral differences between men and
women-when fashioning relevant legal rules. 45 Among other
things, noting these behavioral differences requires legislators to
consider preventative measures, laws, and punishments often over-
looked in the past. If, for example, male sexual behavior, as
selected for during evolution, is a primary motivation for rape,
Jones notes legislators and ethicists might debate chemical castra-
tion of repeated rapists.
1 4 6
B. EA and Employment Discrimination
Jones' analyses identified a legal problem and attempted to
demonstrate how a better understanding of human behavior ob-
tained through evolutionary analysis could improve the law's
142. Id. at 923-24.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, found the VAWA
an unconstitutional extension of Congressional power. United States v. Morrison, 120 U.S.
1740 (2000). Despite this outcomeJones' discussion of VAWA is still informative of how EA
can aid legal discourse and policy formulation.
144. Jones, Biology of Rape, supra note 125, at 921-25.
145. Id. at 910-22.
146. Id. at 913. Note that Jones does not himself advocate chemical castration-he in-
cludes tie discussion only to demonstrate the implications evolutionary analysis has for rape
laws.
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response. EA can play a similar role when incorporated with BLE
and other discussions of human cognition. Mainly, EA can show
that where the law improperly describes human behavior, regula-
tions are unable or less likely to remedy or prevent legal problems.
One field fraught with an incomplete understanding of behavior is
employment discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer to make an adverse employment decision against an in-
dividual because of that person's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. 14 At heart, Title VII seeks to extend equal oppor-
tunities for employment to all individuals. As noted by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4 "The objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportuni-
ties and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.
'
,
49
Among other things, Title VII seeks to eradicate the use of stereo-
types by employers in choosing to hire, promote, fire or otherwise
change the working conditions of employees. 50
Plaintiffs can assert claims under Tide VII via two routes: dispa-
rate treatment 5' or disparate impact 52 theories. Justice Stewart
articulated the difference between the two approaches in Int'l Bd.
Of Teamsters v. United States."5' He wrote:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type
of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). The Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) ex-
tends a similar protection to those over the age of 40. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631-634 (1985).
148. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
149. Id. at 429-30.
150. See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
purpose of the ADEA, like the purpose of Title VII and the ADA, is to eradicate employ-
ment discrimination based on the stigmatizing stereotypes of age, race, gender or
disability."); Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990)) ("[o]ne purpose of
Title VII was 'to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and sense of degradation which
serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women.'"); Hiatt v. Union Pa-
cific R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Wyo. 1994); Holness v. Penn State Univ., 98-2484, 1999
WL 270388, at *1, *7 (E.D. Pa, May 5, 1999) (stating that Title VII protects those individuals
whose employers judge "on stereotypical ideas and beliefs, not merit.").
151. Disparate treatment theory was originally formulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It was later modified by Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
152. Disparate impact was first made available to plaintiffs in Griggs, 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
153. 431 U.S. 324, 327, 335-36 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
FALL 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
less favorably than others because of their race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical.... [Disparate impact] involve[s] employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different
groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.5 4
Of particular interest to this Note is the disparate treatment
model, which requires a showing of an intent to discriminate.
Recent legal scholarship that couples psychology and cognition
to understand stereotyping as it relates to discrimination question
the behavioral assumptions that underlie Title VII and related case
law. 55 In part, studies note that discrimination does not come con-
veniently packaged with conscious motive or intent to
discriminate. Rather, the brain automatically forms and uses
stereotypes that unconsciously bias decision makers and result in
discrimination.
To understand this, we need to examine again how people think
through a discussion of evolution and cognition. As discussed
above, human beings can see based on a perceptive heuristic.5 6 We
are able to decipher visuals because we match what we see with our
generic impressions of colors and shapes present in the world.
Similarly, it appears that the brain developed a capacity to make
decisions relative to environmental factors based on categorical
impressions about these elements. After visually identifying an ob-
ject, a person can recall its properties and appropriately use it. In
the past, if we categorized something as a rock we would have
known to use it as a tool rather than attempt to eat it. Such a
mechanism is necessary because without the ability to categorize,
one would have to approach every object he or she saw as an un-
known entity and "experiment" with it to relearn its properties. We
might have to take a bite out of every rock!
While this example seems rather simple, " [w] hat is a matter of
mere convenience in this mundane example can become literally a
question of life or death in more threatening environments." 57 As
Professor Krieger notes:
154. Id. at 335-36 n.15.
155. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Employment, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1995); Ann
C. McGinley, !Viva La Evoluci6n: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELLJ.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 415, 418-19 (2000); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129,
1131-32 (1999).
156. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
157. RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 42 (1995). Brown explains:
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Every person, and perhaps even every object that we encoun-
ter in the world, is unique, but to treat each as such would be
disastrous. Were we to perceive each object sui generis, we
would rapidly be inundated by an unmanageable complexity
that would quickly overwhelm our cognitive processing and
storage capabilities. Similarly, if our species were "pro-
grammed" to refrain from drawing inferences or taking
action until we had Every person, and perhaps even every ob-
ject that we encounter in the world, is unique, but to treat
each as such would be disastrous. Were we to perceive each
object sui generis, we would rapidly be inundated by an un-
manageable complexity that would quickly overwhelm our
cognitive processing and storage capabilities. Similarly, if our
species were "programmed" to refrain from drawing infer-
ences or taking action until we had complete, situation-
specific data about each person or object we encountered, we
would have died out long ago."'
This capacity is an automatic heuristic-whether or not we
choose to do so, our brain organizes objects into categories and
relies on the characteristics associated with these groupings to
generate predictions about the observed entities.
[T]he world is simply too complex a place for us to be able to survive without some
means of simplifying and ordering it first.... We simply do not have the capability to
respond differently to every single person or event that we encounter. Moreover,
even if we did have that capacity, it would be highly dysfunctional to do so because
such stimuli possess many characteristics in common with each other...
Id. at 41-42.
158. Krieger, supra note 155, at 1188. See also Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in I
STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) ("Since no or-
ganism can cope with infinite diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is
the cutting up of the environment into classifications by which non-identical stimuli can be
treated as equivalent."); Wax, supra note 155, at 1144 ("The mind has evolved methods that
strike an overall compromise between the costs and benefits of attending to the full array of
individualized information available in multiple social encounters. The repeated use of
'quick and dirty' mental rules of thumb may function most efficiently in the aggregate, but
may not represent the best method case by case.").
Some believe that stereotyping is not simply a function of cognitive categorization. See
McGinley, supra note 155, at 421-26. There is also a debate as to whether this automatic
process can be controlled. Compare John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case and Con-
trollability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
361 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) with Galen Bodenhausen et al., On the
Dialectics of Discrimination: Dual Processes in Social Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 271 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
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Like the tendencies discussed by Professor Jones' time shifted
rationality,' 9 this capacity serves us well in contexts similar to the
EEA, but proves problematic given novel applications. Categoriza-
tion, for example, results in stereotypes. These stereotypes may be
appropriate for identifying a person or distinguishing a tree from a
car. But, given our society's normative values, they play an imper-
missible role in our categorization and generalizations about the
characteristics of certain genders, races, and ages.
160
Social cognition theory elucidates the connection between cate-
gorization and stereotypes. As Susan Fiske notes, "[the central
assumption of] [r]esearch on the cognitive bases of stereotyp[es]
... is that stereotyping is based on categorization, and that when
people stereotype, they categorize others in order to simplify the
tasks of social cognition and thus to maximize scarce cognitive re-
sources." 16' As Krieger adds, "[a]ccording to this view, stereotypes,
like other categorical structures, are cognitive mechanisms that all
people, not just 'prejudiced' ones, use to simplify the task of per-
ceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in
memory. They are central, and indeed essential to normal cogni-
tive functioning."6 2  By this rationale, people constantly
unconsciously apply stereotypes when judging others.
This reality produces serious ramifications for Tide VII. If
stereotyping and the corresponding bias are so prevalent, those
instances of discrimination susceptible to Title VII regulation and
its required showing of conscious intent must be drastically under-
inclusive. Additionally, the natural tendency of an adaptive brain
to use stereotypes makes it that much more difficult to meet Con-
gress's goal of eradicating the role of stereotyping in employment
decisions. 
64
159. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
160. As Professor Pinker notes, our minds make "a leap of faith about how the world
works, by making assumptions that are indispensable but indefensible-the only defense
being that the assumptions worked well enough in the world of our ancestors." PINKER,
supra note 18, at 30. Though we may not like the fact that the brain evolved to differentiate
people based on visual clues, it is a valuable tool. At the same time, we need not defend this
habit simply because it is innate. We need not defend the "indefensible."
161. Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping
and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 253 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds.,
1989).
162. Krieger, supra note 155, at 1188.
163. McGinley, supra note 155, at 418-19 ("[I]t is likely that differential treatment of a
female or minority employee in the workplace is because of his race or her gender, even
though the employer is unaware that race or gender motivated the differential treatment. A
rule limiting the definition of discrimination to cases where the employer consciously
treated an employee differently because of membership in a protected class... narrows the
effectiveness of the statute.").
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Stereotyping as an innate cognitive function also forces us to
question the effectiveness of the pretext analysis articulated in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green.15 This standard articulates that employ-
ers use rational models when making employment decisions. If a
plaintiff can prove that he or she is a member of a protected class,
applied for the job, is qualified, and was denied employment and
the defendant cannot proffer a non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment decision, the presumption is that the em-
ployer discriminated in hiring. "Pretext analysis thus rests on the
assumption that, absent discriminatory animus, employment deci-
sion makers are rational actors."' 6 After all, "more often than not
people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any under-
lying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated
as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is [likely that the
employer based his decision on impermissible grounds] .,,67 Social
cognition, as motivated by evolution, however, shows that people
are not rational information processors. Consequently, the as-
sumptions embodied in pretext analysis are false.
168
Given the realities exposed by EA and cognition, Title VII might
be revised to better protect victims of employment discrimination.
In light of its adaptive fit and automatic heuristic, categorization
could likely not be eradicated."" However, there are ways the law
may correct for it. Perhaps liability could be extended for uncon-
scious stereotyping by expanding the definition of intent. 7" Also,
the pretext model could be abandoned,"' or, in a case where an
employer does not take active measures to counter the, hiring
staff's natural tendencies, the presumption could be that the em-
ployer intended these categorical and prejudiced views to
influence the outcome of employment decisions.
165. Krieger, supra note 155, at 1177-78 (discussing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973)).
166. Id. at 1181 (discussing the implications of Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978)).
167. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
168. One might argue that social cognition supports the pretext model. If a qualified
member of a protected class is not hired, the decision must have been based on innate
stereotyping and accordingly prejudice. But as Krieger points out, there is more to it. Em-
ployers otherwise fair and who honestly allege they are not prejudiced, whose justifications
were not believed would not be deemed a liar per se, but someone unable to recognize and
counteract the affects of natural human cognition. See Krieger, supra note 155, at 1242.
169. Id. at 1239-40.
170. Id. at 1242-43.
171. Id. at 1241-42.
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Additionally, given the inevitable nature of stereotyping and the
corresponding bias (prejudice) it has on decision makers, pro-
grams other than Title VII might better combat discrimination in
employment. Though the science is still developing, studies may
reveal a hierarchy to cognition. There may be a means for us to, in
a sense, program our brains to abandon attaching characteristics
to an individual after we place him or her into a category. For ex-
ample, we would utilize categorization to help us tell that Sameer
is a male, South-Asian, and twenty-something (something we would
need to do in order not to forget him) but not attach the corre-
sponding stereotypes. If this is impossible, flooding decision
makers with information or experiences that counter stereotypes
might shift the characteristics expected of a category and, in es-
sence, preclude prejudicial inferences.
In the alternative, we could focus on other cognitive processes
to screen out stereotypes that have been triggered. As Macrae and
Bodenhausen have proposed:
In order to successfully propel their owners through complex
and demanding social environments, minds must be
equipped with two complementary cognitive skills. On the
one hand, they must sensitize perceivers to the invariant fea-
tures of their immediate stimulus worlds.... Knowing what to
expect ... is information that renders the world a meaning-
ful, orderly, and predictable place. On the other hand,
however, to guide behavior in a truly flexible manner, minds
must also be responsive to the presence of unexpected ...
stimulus inputs. An adaptive mind, after all, is one that en-
ables its owner to override automated action plans and
produce novel behavioral outputs as and when these re-
sponses are required.
172
If evolution generated a brain capable of stereotyping, it may
have also produced a mind able to circumvent stereotyping
through an alternative cognitive pathway.
Also note that studies show that the categorization may be con-
trolled. Implicitly operating goals can counter stereotype
activation; individuals with egalitarian goals, for example, did not
rely on stereotypes in their judgments. 173 If true, companies could
172. C. Neil Macrae and Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Catergorically
About Others, 51 ANN. Rv. PSYCHOL. 93, 93-94 (2000) (citations omitted).
173. See Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping: Implicitly Acti-
vated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 Soc. COGNITION 151 (2000).
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focus on instilling similar mindsets in their employees. This is, no
doubt, a daunting task, but necessary to meet the goals of Title VII.
At heart, this Note is not specifically concerned with these pro-
posed reforms and their merits. Scholarship such as Krieger's does
an excellent job of that, and this author is ill equipped to add to
the discussion. Instead, this examination of employment discrimi-
nation intends to demonstrate that EA and its derivative theories
can show us the need to revise legal approaches in light of substan-
tial misunderstanding of human behavior.
CONCLUSION
This Note proceeded as follows. It first described the promise
and limits of behavioral law and economics. The Note then went
on to detail the need for observations provided by BLE to be sub-
sumed under a theory. Next, it noted why evolution provides a
good theoretical backing for BLE's observations. This came as no
surprise given the brain's control over behavior. The Note fol-
lowed with some concrete examples of EA, moved on to critiques
of the movement, and mitigated the strength of those criticisms by
pointing out the promise of unproven theories, a responsible sci-
entific method, and scientific advancement. All along, the purpose
of this path has been to defend evolutionary analysis of the law.
At the same time, this Note does not hold that EA can provide
all of the answers, or that it needs to. Law and economics generally
does a good job as a predictive device. EA should only be used in
addition to law and economics for two reasons. First, EA can fill in
the gaps and refine the assumptions of law and economics. This is
probably the most valuable application of evolutionary studies to
the law. Second, evolution may provide the general predictive the-
ory that social science has long sought. This is by far the more
global objective. Whether or not each of these ends will be at-
tained is uncertain. At the very least, however, evolutionary analysis
and the law presents strong promise.
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